In the United States, effective market exclusivity for a prescription drug is the time between US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval and the availability of the first generic version. Market exclusivity incorporates the minimum regulatory exclusivity periods granted to all FDA-approved drugs (eg, 5 years for new small-molecule drugs as set by the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984), the remaining time on the original patent covering the active ingredient in the drug, the existence of so-called secondary patents covering peripheral aspects of drugs such as metabolites or alternative formulations, 1 and other factors that affect generic entry, such as generic manufacturers' prospects of profit-making in the market and legal settlements between manufacturers of brand-name and generic drugs regarding disputed patents. Recent research has shown that prescription brand-name drugs that eventually face generic competition have, on average, an effective market exclusivity period of 12.4 years. 2 We assessed how the market exclusivity period varied among drugs for different therapeutic areas and for other characteristics of top-selling prescription medications.
Methods | This study was not submitted for institutional review board approval because it is based on publicly available data and involved no health records. , and whether the drug received a priority review. We determined whether the FDA granted each drug a special developmental designation (orphan drug, accelerated approval, or fast-track status). 5 For all drugs that were new molecular entities and became generically available, we used a framework developed by the FDA to categorize their innovativeness and the size of the company that sponsored their FDA applications based on sales revenue. 6 We performed Wilcoxon rank sum and Kruskal-Wallis tests to examine differences among our comparison groups of drugs.
Results | Among the 437 top-selling drugs in our sample, 175 (40.0%) experienced generic competition by the end of 2012 ( Figure) . Only 7 of 50 therapeutic agents in endocrinology Includes imaging agents (n = 2), musculoskeletal drugs (n = 2), ophthalmologic drugs (n = 11), renal drugs (n = 2), transplantation medicine (n = 3), and vaccinations (n = 7).
(14.0%) and 5 of 28 therapeutic agents in hematology and oncology (17.9%) became available as generic formulations during our study period. The median period of market exclusivity for all agents was 12.5 years, ranging from 9.5 years (interquartile range, 7.8-11.0 years) for therapeutic agents that lost market exclusivity in 2000 (n = 7) to 14.6 years (interquartile range, 12.4-15.8 years) for agents losing market exclusivity in 2012 (n = 16). Median effective market exclusivity was longer for drugs undergoing priority review than for those undergoing standard review (14.5 vs 12.0 years, P = .005) and for therapeutic agents with special developmental designations compared with those without such designations (14.8 vs 12.5 years, P = .02). Median duration of market exclusivity also differed by therapeutic area (P = .008), ranging from 8.0 years for analgesics to 14.4 years for infectious disease drugs, 14.5 years for cardiovascular drugs, and 14.8 years for dermatologic agents (Table) . Among new molecular entities, first-in-class agents had longer median periods of effective market exclusivity than drugs classified as additions to a therapeutic class (14.5 vs 12.9 years, P = .04).
Discussion | For top-selling prescription brand-name drugs that faced generic competition, we found that drugs of greater clinical importance and those that received special FDA designations had longer effective market exclusivity periods. We also found a wide range of effective market exclusivity periods among brand-name drugs with the same level of innovativeness and significant variations in exclusivity length across different disease areas.
When making resource allocation decisions, pharmaceutical manufacturers consider the likely length of the market exclusivity period for the product in which they may invest. Recent legislation established a 12-year guaranteed market exclusivity period for all new biologic agents, 7 and some economists have called for an increase in the length of guaranteed After the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approves a new brand-name prescription drug, the drug is protected from generic competition by the combination of 2 market exclusivity mechanisms. Patents cover the intellectual property inherent in the design of a new drug, processes used in manufacturing the medication, and sometimes the application of the drug to clinical practice. Patents last 20 years from the time they are issued, which is usually at least several years before a drug receives FDA approval. Exclusivity, which the FDA grants, supplements patents to ensure that all new drugs have a period of market exclusivity regardless of when their patents were issued.
In this issue, Wang and colleagues 1 describe the length of effective market exclusivity (the combination of patents and exclusivity granted by the FDA) for drugs that were top sellers between 2000 and 2011. By the end of 2012, generic formulations had become available for 40.0% of the drugs that they studied; the median length of market exclusivity was 12.5 years. The typical period of market exclusivity is consistent with that found in another recent analysis, which examined drugs facing generic competition between 1995 and 2012 and reported an average length of market exclusivity in the range of 12.2 to 13.7 years. 2 Since exclusivity awarded by the FDA lasts for only 5 years (or 7 years in the case of orphan drugs), both studies demonstrate that patents are the primary mechanism of market exclusivity. Market exclusivity is intended to help pharmaceutical manufacturers recoup their investment in the drug development process and thereby serves as a stimulus for future investment. Thus, an important question is whether the current length of effective market exclusivity-12 to 13 years on average-is too long, too short, or just right. Unfortunately, this question is difficult to answer because recent estimates of the cost of developing new drugs are controversial and vary substantially.
3 Broadly speaking, current incentives for drug development appear to be adequate because industry's investment in research and development has been consistent in recent years. 4 From a clinical perspective, incentives for drug development should preferentially encourage investment in new drugs that have the potential to improve patient outcomes. According to the study by Wang et al, 1 drugs with priority review status, which the FDA grants to drugs with particular clinical promise, had significantly longer periods of market exclusivity than drugs without such status. Although this finding might seem to suggest that the most promising drugs are systematically rewarded with additional years of market exclusivity, this is unlikely. Neither patents nor exclusivity granted by the FDA distinguish between drugs according to their potential effect on patients. A more plausible explanation is that drugs receiving priority review tend to have shorter development times and the FDA approves them more quickly; thus, their patents are effective for more years after their approval.
To further encourage the development of drugs that address patients' needs, the FDA could be empowered by new laws to offer an additional period of market exclusivity to drugs that are shown to have substantial clinical benefit. Since 2002, when the FDA, under the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, started to grant an additional 6 months of exclusivity to pharmaceutical manufacturers completing pediatric studies of new drugs, the amount of information about the safety and efficacy of drugs in children has markedly increased. 5 The 6 months of exclusivity is appended to both patents and exclusivity granted by the agency. In addition, a bill introduced in Congress in December 2014 proposes to offer 15 years of exclusivity for drugs that have the potential to address unmet medical need, under the condition the manufacturer waive its rights to the patents protecting the drug. 6 Whatever mechanism is used, determining the threshold for awarding additional exclusivity to drugs with substantial clinical benefit would be challenging, and reaching consensus regarding the best approach would be difficult. As a regulatory agency, the FDA evaluates the safety and efficacy of new drugs. However, these approaches to the awarding of additional exclusivity would require that the agency make a determination about the incremental effect of new drugs in the context of existing treatment options, a responsibility that would fall outside of its current mandate and, given the high stakes, would attract substantial scrutiny.
Regardless of whether market exclusivity incentives are used to further encourage the development of medications with clinical importance, physicians must help patients make informed choices about the use of new drugs. If new brandname drugs are used primarily in situations where they offer clear benefits compared with generic medications and other therapies, then patents and regulatory incentives will be working well.
Patterns of Use and Cost for Inappropriate Radioactive Iodine Treatment for Thyroid Cancer in the United States: Use and Misuse
Based on current guidelines, adjuvant radioactive iodine (RAI) therapy is not recommended for localized papillary thyroid tumors measuring 1 cm or less, medullary thyroid cancer (MTC), and anaplastic thyroid cancer (ATC).
1-3 Nevertheless, previous studies have reported the use of RAI in the treatment of these cancers.
The aim of the current study was to analyze patterns of inappropriate RAI use in the United States to identify potential misuses leading to increased costs for the health care system and unnecessary patient exposure to the risk and potential complications of RAI therapy. 4 Methods | The National Cancer Data Base was used to identify patients diagnosed with ATC, MTC, and papillary thyroid cancer from 1998 to 2011. 5 The Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results database was used to cross-validate the National Cancer Data Base patient population. 6 The study was granted exempt status by the Duke University Institutional Review Board. Patient consent was not obtained as it was not necessary. All adult patients with ATC and MTC were included in the analyses. Inclusion criteria for patients with papillary thyroid cancer were the following: papillary thyroid microcarcinoma (PTMC) measuring 1 cm or less, no aggressive histologic variants, no extrathyroidal extension, no regional or distant metastases, and negative margin status.
Estimates of costs were obtained from the 2011 and 2014 Medicare reimbursement schedule and from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (Table) . Costs were estimated only for PTMCs.
Results | In the National Cancer Data Base, 49 of 3095 ATCs (1.6%), 217 of 6375 MTCs (3.4%), and 14 146 of 60 586 PTMCs (23.3%) were inappropriately treated with RAI.
In univariate analyses, patients with ATCs who received RAI were younger than those who did not (P < .001), had lower income (P = .01), were from a rural or urban rather than a metropolitan county (P = .04), and had smaller tumors (P = .001). Patients with MTCs whose management included RAI were less likely to be treated in academic facilities (P < .001) and had smaller tumors (P = .02).
Patients with PTMCs treated with RAI were younger, more often white, managed in nonacademic centers, and were more likely to have multifocal and larger tumors (all P < .001). While the overall incidence of PTMC significantly increased over time, the proportion of PTMCs treated with RAI has decreased. When stratified by facility type, the rate of RAI administration showed
